Introduction
In his "Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique" Robert Lucas (1976) explicitly criticized Keynesian macroeconometric models for their inability to correctly predict the effects of alternative economic policies (ibid., 20) .
2 His argument against these models, as
Lucas himself put it, relied on "a single syllogism":
Given that the structure of an econometric model consists of optimal decision rules of economic agents, and that optimal decision rules vary systematically with changes in the structure of series relevant to the decision maker, it follows that any change in policy will systematically alter the structure of econometric models (ibid., 41).
Therefore, Lucas's criticism would be a matter of logic in which (A) the structure of an econometric model is based on relations that describe the behavior of economic agents; (B) this behavior changes along with changes in the decisions of policy-makers; and (C) the structure of the model also changes along with changes in economic policy. Following the logical construction of his argument, Lucas (1976) drew a prescriptive methodological principle: in order to build models that are reliable for quantitative policy evaluation, modelers should formulate behavioral equations that take into account individuals' responses to changes in policies. In turn, this logically grounded prescriptive principle set the bases for the criticism of the Keynesian models, which, according to Lucas, did not abide by this principle, and therefore conducted to misleading policy evaluations.
Today, most contemporary macroeconomists and some historians of economics interpret the Lucas Critique along the lines of a "syllogism," i.e. as a fundamental principle for economic reasoning that was (and still is) logically unquestionable and that led forcefully 2 Lucas (1976, 19, fn.2; 21) explicitly referred to Klein and Goldberger (1955) and Tinbergen (1952) , even if his Critique targeted more generally the various models stemming from these works. Hereafter, we characterize this line of work as "Keynesian macroeconometrics," as is common in the historiographical literature.
The Lucas Critique in the history of macroeconomics The widespread interpretation of the Critique
Consistently with Lucas's own summary of his argument as a logical principle, the Lucas Critique is often understood as a logical axiom or a fundamental principle for producing consistent policy evaluation. 5 We provide a wide perspective of these reactions by covering as much ground as possible in terms of the number of authors studied. However, the contributions selected here are also the only ones that provided a substantial discussion of the Lucas Critique during this period. This selection was based on our careful scrutiny of all the papers citing Lucas (1976) or mentioning the "Lucas Critique."
Lucas argued that models conceived for policy evaluation should necessarily involve a careful description of the changes in the behavior of economic agents as a reaction to changes in economic policy rules. Although this argument is usually associated with the rational expectations hypothesis, it actually relies on a less technical definition: since economic agents take into account government decisions to adjust their behavior, the government should formulate its policy considering people's reactions. This interpretation of the Critique is widespread among macroeconomists and historians. (Sargent, 2013, xxii) . Sargent (1980) had presented this idea through an example drawn from football (namely, how a change in the offside rule would affect players' behavior) and indicated that:
historical patterns of human behaviour often depend on the rules of the game in which people are participating. Since much human behaviour is purposeful, it makes sense to expect that it will change to take advantage of changes in the rules (ibid., 15).
Sargent endorsed the syllogism underlying the Lucas Critique, resulting in the fundamental principle that individuals adapt their behavior in order "to take advantage of changes in the rules." Although it might appear "trivial to football supporters," this principle brings important consequences for macroeconometric modeling as it implies that "the field of macroeconomics must be reconstructed in order to take account of this principle of human behaviour" (ibid. were unable to provide sound policy evaluations, because they failed to take into account "the fact that agents change their decisions when faced with a change in the policy regime" (ibid.).
The Lucas Critique: A cornerstone in the standard narrative of the history of macroeconomics
Interpreted as a fundamental principle, the Lucas Critique is supposed to have provided the ultimate argument against Keynesian macroeconomics. Preston Miller, for instance, argues that "the Lucas Critique was fatal and [that after it] new approaches had to be developed" (Miller, 1994, xv (Hall, 1996, 38 Michael Woodford (2003, 13) states that the first basic principle for building consistent macroeconomic models today is "to evaluate alternative monetary policies in a way that avoids the flaw in policy evaluation exercises using traditional Keynesian macroeconometric models stressed by Lucas (1976) ". 6 Hall's reference to the "empirical force of the critique" is revealing of a haste in assimilating the logical (or theoretical) strength of the argument with its empirical and practical relevance. The controversy on the latter point, and particularly the fact that empirical evidence was not clear-cut, is precisely the issue that we emphasize through the analysis of the Keynesian replies to the Critique.
Challenging the standard narrative on the Lucas Critique is therefore not a simple matter of historical accuracy (i.e. to shed light on the Keynesian responses that have been ignored so far). Conversely, the aim of our historical investigation is to unveil how the Critique, instead of closing, opened a broader debate. In this sense, Lucas's contribution has been a starting point for the history of macroeconomics, and not an ending point or a "fatal strike" against a whole macroeconomics tradition, and so our assessment provides historical perspective to the ongoing debate on the relevance and interpretation of the Critique within today's DSGE approach (Sergi, 2018) . The Keynesians' reactions to the Critique allow us to unveil and discuss the complexity of Lucas's original argument, which goes far beyond the logical syllogism proposed by the standard narrative.
The old Keynesians' replies to the Critique
The older Keynesian generation (Klein, Modigliani, Tobin, Solow, and Malinvaud) acknowledged that, in principle, Lucas (1976) had pointed out a relevant limitation of their macroeconometric modeling practice-namely, the study of agents' expectations. This is an important point, since the reactions of these Keynesians to the Critique are entangled with their criticism of the rational expectations hypothesis (Tobin, 1981; Solow, 1978) . Since
Lucas used the rational expectation hypothesis to present his argument, it is not surprising to see some Keynesians criticizing simultaneously the rational expectations hypothesis and the Critique. To them, indeed, this hypothesis simply did not solve the problem highlighted by
Lucas. In his interview with Klamer (1984, 125-126) , Modigliani emphasized he had "no objection of principle" on the idea that individuals can react to changes in policy. However, he claimed that his objection was "not one of principles, but of applications" or one of the "specific implications" of dealing with this fundamental idea [of] using rational expectations" (ibid.).
Yet, the decisive point in the old Keynesians reaction is elsewhere: Keynesians never took for granted the empirical relevance of the Critique. In fact, they regarded Lucas (1976) essentially as a theoretical argument, which was still to be tested for its practical relevance for economic policy, and for its ability to be integrated into macroeconometric modeling.
Old Keynesians actually had an a priori judgment on the relevance of the Critique for their modeling practices. An insightful illustration of this stance is Malinvaud (1998, 335) showed no more than a possibility and were in no way tested as to their empirical validity (Malinvaud, 1997, 21) .
The important point here is that, to Malinvaud and the old Keynesians, the burden of the proof of the empirical relevance of the Critique rested on its new classical promoters, and so, the Critique should not be admitted a priori.
For their part, new classical macroeconomists were in agreement with the idea that the Lucas Critique should be assessed on empirical bases, and were willing to accept the burden of the proof. Lucas and Sargent made this point in their polemical piece "After Keynesian agreement between Keynesians and New Classicals on "the burden of proof" unveils how misleading it would be to read Lucas's paper as suggesting "a simple syllogism" or a fundamental logical principle.
Econometric investigations of the younger Keynesians and empirical relevance of the Lucas Critique
Conversely to the older generation, a younger generation of Keynesians did not hesitate to assume the burden of testing the empirical relevance of the Critique.
This younger generation of Keynesians used empirical methods to establish the cases when the Lucas Critique was useful and necessary for economic analysis and when it was not. More precisely, young Keynesians ran econometric tests on the structural relations of their models, and searched for structural breaks and parameters instability after a change in policy rules. The empirical analysis of the Phillips curve-which was crucial in Keynesian models for discussing the role of fiscal and monetary policies-played a central role in these tests. 9 The simple question that Keynesians were willing to address was whether actual changes in policy (such as the alleged inflationary monetary and fiscal policies of the 1960s, or the "Volcker experience" in 1979) had truly led to a change in behavioral relations underlying Keynesian models-as suggested by Lucas.
The Keynesian econometric replies to the Critique appeared only at the end of the 1970s with the publication of Blinder (1979) , although Lucas's paper had been well-known and discussed in academia since 1973 (Goutsmedt et al., 2015, 15-16 Lucas (1972a Lucas ( , 1972b Lucas ( , 1973b and in his joint paper with Sargent (1979) . 10 For further details on this episode see . Bodkin et al., 1991; Acosta and Pinzón-Fuchs, 2018) . In this view, macroeconometric modeling was conceived as a practice driven by econometric work that addressed concrete economic questions within a specific context, and that provided daily expertise in matters of economic policy. Therefore, the Keynesian replies to the Critique focused on the econometric analysis of parameters' stability of particular relations at particular periods. This line of work resulted in the rejection of the Critique and its implications for macroeconometric modeling, because it did not seem to provide empirically relevant evidence to explain stagflation, evaluate disinflationary policies, or put into question the Phillips Curve.
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This position is well represented by Blinder (1983, 14-15) who acknowledged that the "criticisms of the old econometrics made by Lucas, Sargent and others are not wrong; they are absolutely correct." Yet, "saying this in no way denies the validity of the Lucas critique, but merely points out that it may not always be of great empirical importance." To Blinder,
"the critique should take its place as one among many serious problems that confront the applied econometrician" together "with violations of the assumptions of the Gauss-Markov theorem," which have "not stopped applied econometrics in its tracks (though it has given cause for humility)":
Perhaps the Lucas critique should be treated in the same way. This broader perspective dictates that we follow a more pragmatic, case by case, approach in which we recognize that other problems may be more important than the Lucas critique in particular cases (Blinder, 1983, 14-15) .
In addition, as Lucas himself recognized (Lucas, 1976, 20, fn.2) , the problem of structural change in macroeconometric models had already been addressed by the "founding fathers" of econometrics, especially by Trygve Haavelmo (1944, 27) , Jan Tinbergen (1956, Chap. 5) , and Jacob Marschak (1953, 8, 25) . These early econometricians had tackled this problem from a pragmatic and empirical perspective, considering it relevant for econometric policy evaluation in particular cases (Goutsmedt et al., 2015, 10-13) . In this sense, the 1970s and 1980s Keynesians replies to Lucas are marked by an important inheritance of this macroeconometric tradition.
Blinder on U.S. stagflation
After the first oil shock of October 1973, inflation and unemployment rose simultaneously for several years and the Phillips Curve seemed to disappear. For Blinder, the stability of the latter was the central issue to be addressed in response to the Lucas Critique.
Indeed, by dismissing the traditional inverse relation between inflation and unemployment, the Critique seemed to offer not only an explanation for the observed disappearance of the Phillips curve in the 1970s, but also of the inability of Keynesian models to foresee this event, and a reason for dismissing Keynesian expertise in economic policy.
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However, Blinder's conviction was that this interpretation of stagflation was simply not relevant. Retrospectively, he argued that the success of the Lucas Critique had been the result of a bad inference according to which economists "put two and two together and jumped like lemmings to the wrong conclusion" (Blinder, 1988, 278) . Those economists who saw the rising inflation and the changes in the correlation between inflation and unemployment thought not only that "the government had adopted a more inflationary policy" (ibid.), but also that the Critique would explain all these movements. Blinder revolted against that use of the Critique, and claimed that there was no proof whatsoever that the disappearance of the traditional Phillips curve during the 1970s was the consequence of a 12 Blinder's argument refers to Lucas and Sargent's (1979) claim that the stagflation period represented an "econometric failure on a grand scale" for Keynesian models, and that misleading predictions inspired inflationary policies (Lucas and Sargent, 1979, 6 Blinder argued that empirical evidence (checking whether changes in the economic behavior of agents had a true and substantial effect on the relation of interest) is the cornerstone of scientific practice, and that the Critique does not abide by this standard.
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These strong statements about the empirical irrelevance of the Critique were the result of several econometric tests. Blinder (1979) was (chronologically) the first to address the Critique by considering a simple empirical Phillips curve: 14 # = ( )̇# )* + ( # ) + # 13 Likewise, to Fischer (1983) , "the general point made by the critique [was] correct and was known before it was […] pronounced by Lucas." Yet, "that the point has been important empirically" was "something that should have demonstrated rather than asserted" (Fischer, 1983, 271 14 The following formalization is inspired from Blinder (1988) rather than from the first version of the test (Blinder, 1979, 92 that "there is no evidence for a shift in the lag coefficients ( )" (Blinder, 1988, 283) , which he considered a direct empirical evidence against the Critique.
Blanchard on the Volcker deflation
The second example of Keynesian empirical investigation on the stability of the Phillips curve is Blanchard's (1984) "The Lucas Critique and the Volcker Deflation." The "Volcker experience," besides tightening monetary policy, constituted a substantial change in the way of implementing policy, since the Fed decided to use money supply as a target, and to communicate publicly on the targeting process, in October 1979. According to the Lucas Critique, this could have resulted in a drift in behavioral parameters describing the behavior of private agents. Thus, Blanchard tried to assess the effect of this change in monetary policy on the structure of the Phillips curve, and on the term structure of interest rates.
In this sense, Blanchard analyzed these two relations as they were specified and estimated in two large scale macroeconometric models of the 1970s: (1) 
Gordon and King on the sacrifice ratio
A third example of the Keynesian replies to the Lucas Critique is Gordon and King (1982) , although the Critique is not the central issue in their paper. Instead, the paper aims at establishing, through VAR models, the value of the sacrifice ratio for the U.S. (i.e., the cost in terms of output gap of a one-point reduction in inflation). But an entire section of this article is also dedicated to dismissing the empirical relevance of the Critique-which is, indeed, crucial for supporting the idea of a positive sacrifice ratio.
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15 Similar conclusions were reached by Englander and Los (1983) and Taylor (1984) . Although Taylor (1984) contradicted Blanchard's results on the Phillips curve, he was inclined to reject his own estimation, since it was based on a smaller sample. 16 Indeed, following the Critique: if (A) a disinflation policy is put in practice, then (B) agents adapt their behavior (expecting lower prices in the future, they increase their current labor supply), generating a simultaneous fall in inflation and rise in output (so that sacrifice ratio is starts with an attempt to spot any change in the policy regime, which contrasts with Blanchard (1984) and Taylor (1984) , who simply assume this change from the beginning.
Gordon and King estimated a feedback monetary growth rule and an inflation equation (both for 1954-1980) , then tested the estimated rule with Chow's method. The values of the Chow tests indicated a break in 1967:1 for the equations of quarterly M1 growth (Gordon and King, 1982, 406-407) , but no break for the inflation equation. 17 These results dismissed the Lucas
Critique argument in the estimation of a sacrifice ratio, leaving "no solid reason to think there would be a marked change in the structure of the inflation equation, and thus in the estimated sacrifice ratio" (ibid., 407). Consequently, their further estimation, resulting in a positive sacrifice ratio (4.3), would legitimately illustrate the costly inefficiency of Volcker's policy.
Even if they did not target the Lucas Critique directly, further works on the cost of the disinflation policy that used more recent data, supported Gordon and King's (1982) conclusion. Specifically, George Perry (1983 ), Otto Eckstein (1985 , and Benjamin Friedman (1985) empirically showed that the sacrifice ratio during the Volcker-Reagan era was approximately the same as the one estimated in the late 1970s.
18 zero); it follows that (C) if a model does not take into account (B), then the sacrifice ratio associated with (A) is overestimated. 17 This method differs both from Blanchard (1984) and Taylor (1984) , where structural breaks were investigated by adding progressively a further year into the estimation sample. Gordon and King considered that Blanchard and Taylor's method was weak, considering the small size of their sample. 18 However, these results were contentious, especially because they did not provide direct evidence on the empirical relevance of Lucas's argument. McCallum (1984) argued that these tests ignored an underlying assumption in Lucas's argument, namely that policy changes should be credible. Thus, the cost of the disinflation policy could be explained by the fact that agents did not believe the restrictive commitment of the Fed and did not adjust their expectations quickly enough.
Some Keynesian alternative explanations to the U.S. stagflation
In the previous section, we presented Keynesian contributions that converged towards a similar conclusion: the change in parameters following a change in economic policy has no empirical pertinence to explain the economic context of the 1970s and the early 1980s. This second dimension of the Lucas Critique was not skipped by the Keynesians and the purpose of this section is to deal with their reactions in this respect. In the first place, it is worth noting that they recognized their macroeconometric models had not performed at their best during the 1970s. Yet, the Keynesians unanimously rejected parameters' instability as a significant source of this failure. Some of the Keynesians' alternative explanations to address stagflation had in common the introduction of new variables in the existing macroeconometric models in order to take into account the changes in the economic environment. In particular, they plead for a better description of the supply side of the U.S.
economy, and for the introduction of supply shocks on energy and raw material.
In his correspondence with Lucas, Fischer made clear that he considered the Critique as "one possible source" of the "bad" predictions of the econometric models "for the early seventies." However, "there were many other potential sources of errors" such as those caused by "single equation estimation methods [or by] simple misspecification in [structural] equations," and yet "no one that [Fischer] [knew] of ha [d] made the empirical connection between the bad forecasts of the models and [Lucas's] critique."(ibid., Fischer to Lucas, 31/12/1981) 19 In later works, Fischer returned to what he thought were the most important "other potential sources" to be investigated, and "misspecification in individual equations" came on top of the agenda. According to him, the Phillips curve especially needed to be reformulated by adding an expectational term after Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968) . This reformulation had been known to modelers since the late sixties, and had been integrated to major models (such as the MPS model which integrated it in 1974). 20 However, this did not prevent from other sources of misspecification, causing the kind of parameters' variability pointed out by the Critique:
The 1973 supply shock also led to an under-prediction of inflation in the major models, but that has nothing to do with the Lucas critique-unless the Lucas critique is reduced to the statement that models are inevitably misspecified (Fischer, 1988, 302) .
On this issue, Blinder (1987, 133) argued that once expectational variables were added to the Phillips curve equation, as well as "supply shocks," the major models would fit the 1970s data more accurately. Fischer and Blinder considered here the misspecification of the Phillips curve (i.e. omitted expectation and supply shock variables) to be the source of prediction failures. Consequently, the problem had to be solved by adding further relevant 19 To what Lucas argued that the existence of other problems in Keynesian models was in no way evidence against the Critique: "I certainly agree with you that in principle there are many possibilities besides the failure to possess parameter invariance. There are a lot of ways to do economics badly, and I am willing to believe that one can find all of them in these large-scale models." (ibid., Lucas to Fischer, 02/07/1982) . 20 On the history of the Phillips curve and its multiple avatars, see Qin (2011) and Forder (2014 would generate a situation of rising unemployment and rising inflation (Klein, 1985, 293) .
Hence, the neglect of the energy and food sectors constituted the source of underestimation of the inflation rate in the forecasts of the Wharton model. According to Klein, the prediction problem was about to be solved by the end of the 1970s, when macroeconometric models had managed to introduce the energy and agricultural sectors in a satisfactory manner (ibid., 292). Furthermore, this new available feature allowed econometricians to build "an amplified model that was able to handle the inflation problem more realistically by mid-1975, when inflation was still strong" (ibid. (Klein, 1978) . Klein defended the idea that the supply side of the macroeconometric models was underdeveloped and proposed combining them with the "Leontief model of interindustrial flows" (ibid., 1). As Klein explained, retrospectively, until the 1970s "[m] any people failed to realize how important energy or oil, in particular, was for the economy because it represented only a tiny share of total GNP" (Klein, 1985, 290) .
Henceforth, developing this "supply side" was on the top of his research agenda, and was actually followed by other researchers at the time. 24 Gordon followed a research path similar to the one advocated by Klein. In a series of articles, he developed an elaborated "triangle" model to explain stagflation (Gordon 1975 (Gordon , 1984 . In his framework, inflation was explained in addition to the employment rate by price inertia (a form of adaptive expectations in which inflation yesterday explains inflation today), and supply shocks. Gordon (2011) defends his model still nowadays, showing its capacity to fit the data, and to explain indirectly the failures of the large-scale-model-based predictions of the end of the 1960s and 1970s.
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In conclusion, it is worth noting that not only these authors but most Keynesians defended the view that the Lucas Critique was not relevant to address stagflation. For them, the true challenge on macroeconometric models given by stagflation was elsewhere. In his conclusive statement to the conference "After the Phillips Curve," held at the Boston Fed in June 1978, Solow suggested indeed-in line with Klein and Eckstein-that the main priority was to improve the macroeconometric models by developing the supply side of the economy, and by carrying on with empirical work on "the side of food, oil, nonfuel minerals, and the depreciation of the dollar" (Solow, 1978, 205) .
Concluding Remarks
In this article, we studied some of the 1970s and 1980s Keynesian replies to the Lucas Critique. So far, these replies had been either ignored or disqualified by the standard narrative of the history of macroeconomics, which relies on the interpretation of Lucas (1976) as a logical argument that inevitably dismissed Keynesian models. We argued instead that this interpretation misses the main point of the Keynesian replies, which consisted in questioning the empirical relevance of Lucas's argument to account for the macroeconomic context of the time.
The case of the reception of the Critique serves as an illustration of a general historiographical point. If one took the histories told by macroeconomists today as faithful accounts of the history of the discipline, one would discover a narrative in which the old Keynesians had suddenly stopped contributing to macroeconomics during the 1970s, and a history in which their works had been erased. Here, we hope to have made the case that, if there was a Keynesian retreat, this was a structured one. Their empirical work should not be perceived as an attempt to simply preserve the status quo of the discipline, nor should their refusal to take into consideration Lucas's arguments be seen as a kind of theoretical conservatism or ideological bias. The main claim of this paper is that their replies were motivated by the very nature of the Keynesian macroeconometric tradition, which consisted in addressing concrete economic situations with empirical rigor. In this sense, testing econometrically the relevance of Lucas's argument was a natural way of approaching the question on a scientific basis. Similarly, neglecting rational expectations as the main point of their research agenda was natural, since empirical evidence indicated that supply shocks accounted as the main factor of the 1970s stagflation. These replies, however, were neither sufficient to take down the Lucas Critique nor to stop the development of new classical macroeconomics, which was perceived by some Keynesians such as Blinder or Malinvaud, as an illegitimate "palace coup" that lacked an empirical basis.
